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The Un-American Activities
Committee and the Courtst
Robert K. Carr*
No congressional investigating committee has ever had its
work subjected to such a large measure of judicial review as has
the House Un-American Activities Committee. Since its establishment as a permanent committee in 1945 it has been engaged
in almost continuous conflict with its witnesses. This conflict
in turn has resulted in a steady flow of cases to the courts raising
legal questions as to the Committee's authority and procedures.
Between 1946 and 1950 some nine such cases reached the federal
appellate courts. These cases have aroused the hopes of many of
the Committee's critics that it may finally find its Nemesis in the
courts. Having failed to persuade the House of Representatives
to abolish the Committee or to limit its authority or procedures,
the Committee's opponents have transferred the struggle to the
courts and have counted heavily upon favorable judicial rulings
to curb the Committee's worst abuses, if, indeed, they have not
expected the judiciary to declare the Committee unconstitutional
and outlaw it completely. But these hopes and expectations have
not been realized for not a single final judicial ruling adverse to
the interests of the Committee has yet been made.' Moreover,
it is significant that the United States Supreme Court has shown
great reluctance to review the cases that have raised the most
t This article will form part of a book on the Un-American Activities
Committee to be published shortly by the Cornell University Press.
* Joel Parker Professor of Law and Political Science, Dartmouth College.
A.B., Dartmouth College (1929), A.M., Harvard University (1930); Ph.D., Har-

vard University (1935). Executive Secretary to the President's Committee on

Civil Rights (1947). Author, Democracy and the Supreme Court (1936), The
Supreme Court and Judicial Review (1942), Federal Protection of Civil Rights
(1947).

1. One witness, Richard Morford, who was prosecuted in the courts and
found guilty on the charge of contempt, gained temporary relief when the
Supreme Court ruled that he was entitled to a new trial on the ground that
legal error, prejudicial to his interests, had occurred in the first trial. But
upon being tried again he was found guilty a second time, and the appellate
courts let this verdict stand.
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serious constitutional issues concerning the work of the Committee and has seemingly been content to let the federal courts
of appeals render final decisions upon these issues.
That congressional investigations should be subject to any
judicial supervision whatsoever may well occasion surprise. It is
one thing for the federal courts to invalidate the substance of a
congressional statute on the ground that it conflicts with the
Constitution; it is quite a different thing for the judicial branch
to review the procedural activities of the legislature. Whether
the jurisdiction granted to one of its committees by the House
or Senate is proper constitutionally might well be viewed as a
"political question" to be decided by Congress itself. With respect
to committee procedures it may at first thought seem that private
persons appearing before a congressional committee are entitled
to protection under the Bill of Rights and to relief in the courts
where their procedural rights are encroached upon. But examination of the Bill of Rights suggests that such famous procedural
requirements as avoidance of unreasonable searches and seizures,
allowing an accused person immunity against testifying against
himself, making provision for the assistance of counsel or trial
by jury are all closely associated with criminal proceedings in a
court. When the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution says, "In
all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right ... to
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
assistance of counsel for his defense" it may well be asked how
a provision, so worded, can have any possible bearing upon the
rights of a witness before a committee of Congress or how it can
possibly serve as a basis for judicial review of the proceedings of
such a committee.
As a matter of fact for almost one hundred years the congressional investigation "flourished virtually free from judicial
supervision or control." 2 Then in 1880 in what is still an exceedingly controversial decision, Kilbourn v. Thompson, the Supreme
Court brought this activity of the national legislature under a
very substantial measure of control by the courts and for the
first and only time declared that a specific congressional inquiry
2. Morgan, Congressional Investigations and Judicial Review: Kilbourn
v. Thompson Revisited, 37 Calif. L. Rev. 556 (1949). One authority on congressional Investigations points out that there was disagreement in Congress
from the beginning aa to whether the Bill of Rights had any bearing upon
congressional proceedings. Eberling, Congressional Investigations, 251, 283288, 319 (1928).
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was an improper one.3 In spite of the fact that Kilbourn v.
Thompson has not fathered subsequent Supreme Court decisions
holding other congressional investigations improper it has never
been repudiated by the Court, and it has encouraged successive
generations of critics to hope that the "witch hunts" of the moment might be suppressed through judicial intervention. It is
significant that liberals and conservatives have taken turns supporting and condemning judicial supervision of congressional
investigations, as the inquiries themselves have ranged from liberal to conservative in motivation and character. During the
1920s and 1930s the inquiries were generally in the hands of
liberal Congressmen and found staunch defenders in liberal
commentators, whereas conservatives recalled Kilbournv. Thompson and suggested the need for judicial intervention. In articles
in learned journals and popular magazines alike such liberals
as James M. Landis and Felix Frankfurter deplored the Kilbourn
case and warned that the courts should "keep hands off" congressional investigations. On the other hand, such a conservative lawyer as Frederic R. Coudert gave to his article for a learned
journal the title, "Congressional Inquisition vs. Individual Liberty," and was not unwilling to see the courts curb what Walter
Lippmann was calling "that legalized atrocity, the congressional
investigation." 4
A generation later the shoe was on the other foot. The UnAmerican Activities Committee and other congressional committees with a conservative orientation had liberals sadly disturbed
and inclined to look to the courts for help, whereas conservatives
found it convenient to argue that it would be unfortunate were
the courts to attempt to check these committees. One cannot avoid
a sense of amazement at coming upon a law review article by that
3. 103 U.S. 168 (1880).
4. Among the articles protesting either expressly or by implication against

judicial intervention were: Frankfurter, Hands Off the Investigation, 33 New
Republic 329 (1927); Landis, Constitutional Limitations on the Congressional
Power of Investigation, 40 Harv. L. Rev. 153 (1926); Potts, Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish for Contempt, 74 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 691 (1926); Wigmore, Legislative Power to Compel Testimonial Disclosure, 19 Ill. L. Rev. 452
(1924).
The position of the above authorities is well expressed by the assertion
of Potts that: "Public policy would seem to require that only in the clearest
cases of want of jurisdiction and of oppression should the courts interfere

with the legislative investigations." (74 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 691, 829.)
Among the articles attacking the use of investigating power by Congress
and looking with favor upon the possibility of a judicial check to the use of
the power by Congress were Courdert, Congressional Inquisitions v. Individual

Liberty, 15 Va. L. Rev. 537 (1929); Loring, Powers of Congressional Investigation Committees, 8 Minn. L. Rev. 595 (1924).
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bitter, and once implacable critic of judicial review, Louis B.
Boudin, in which he enthusiastically supports a judicial check
on congressional committees as a means of safeguarding personal
rights.5 On the other hand, Gerald D. Morgan, former Assistant
Legislative Counsel for the House of Representatives, has recently
renewed the attack upon Kilbourn v. Thompson, asserting that
the effect of this Supreme Court decision "was to treat the Senate
and House of Representatives, when exercising an inherent power
at the very threshold of the legislative process, as having a status
analogous to that of an inferior court of limited or special jurisdiction." Morgan reminds his readers of Justice Holmes' words
that it "must be remembered that legislatures are ultimate guardians of the liberties of the people in quite as great a degree as
the courts" and of Justice Frankfurter's assertion that "interference by the courts is not conducive to the development of
habits of responsibility," and comes to the conclusion that we
should "return the workings of the legislative process to the
exclusive jurisdiction and control of the legislature." 6
Review by the courts of the work of the Un-American Activities Committee must be examined against this background of
alternate distrust by liberals and conservatives of judicial interference with the investigative function of Congress. Moreover,
the actual record of the Committee's relations with the courts
can be understood and evaluated only if the court-promulgated
rules of constitutional law concerning the investigating power
of Congress are kept in mind.
It is now clearly established by decision of the Supreme
Court that Congress possesses implied power to seek factual information through committee investigations to enable it to exercise its lawmaking powers. The decision of the Court in the
Kilbourn case seventy years ago was but a temporary check to
the establishment of this rule. In that case the Court held that
the House of Representatives had exceeded the limits of its power
5. Boudin, Congressional and Agency Investigations: Their Uses and
Abuses, 35 Va. L. Rev. 143 (1949). Another recent discussion in support of
judicial supervision of congressional investigations is Note, 47 Col. L. Rev. 416
(1947).
6. Morgan, supra note 2, at 556. The Holmes quote is from the Court
opinion in Missouri, Kansas, and Texas Ry. v. May, 194 U.S. 267, 270 (1904)
and the Frankfurter quote from the Court opinion in Federal Communications Commission v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 146 (1940).
Another recent article which looks generally with disfavor upon the prospect
of judicial supervision of congressional investigations is Ehrmann, The Duty
of Disclosure in Parliamentary Investigation: A Comparative Study, 11 U. of
Chi. L. Rev. 1, 117 (1943, 1944).
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in authorizing one of its committees to inquire into the failure of
the banking house, Jay Cooke and Company, even though the
Secretary of the Navy had made "improvident deposits" of federal funds with the company. In the resolution authorizing the
inquiry the House had failed to point out that the findings of the
committee might result in the enactment of remedial legislation,
and the Court concluded that the investigation was a "fruitless"
undertaking.7 The Court found its position strengthened by the
fact that the failure of the banking house had already become
the subject of litigation in the courts, and also by its feeling that
the congressional committee had encroached improperly upon
the privacy of witnesses called before it.
The use of the investigating power as a means of obtaining
information essential to the enactment of legislation was expressly approved by the Supreme Court for the first time in 1927
in the well-known case of McGrain v. Daugherty. In an opinion
for a unanimous Court Justice Van Deventer said:
"We are of opinion that the power of inquiry-with process to enforce it-is an essential and appropriate auxiliary
to the legislative function....
A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions
which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and
where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information-which not infrequently is true-recourse
must be had to others who do possess it." s
Moreover, the Court held that a Senate inquiry to determine
whether or not the Department of Justice was properly performing its duties was a valid one even though the Senate had neglected to make specific reference in the resolution authorizing
the inquiry to the possibility that legislation might result from it.
There has never been a specific Supreme Court decision up7. The Court commented upon the resolution as follows:
"The resolution contains no hint of any intention of final action by
Congress on the subject. In all the argument of the case no suggestion is
made of what the House of Representatives or the Congress could have done
in the way of remedying the wrong or securing the creditors of Jay Cooke
and Company, or even the United States. Was it simply a fruitless investigation into the personal affairs of individuals? If so, the House of Representatives had no power or authority in the matter more than any other equal
number of gentlemen interested for the government of their country. By
'fruitless' we mean that it could result in no valid legislation on the subject
to which the inquiry referred." 103 U.S. 168, 194 (1880).
8. 273 U.S. 135, 174-175 (1927).
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holding the investigative power of Congress as a means of achieving the two other purposes which have in practice figured so
prominently in many investigations: checking the administrative
branch of the government, and influencing public opinion. As a
matter of fact, there has been no real need for the Court expressly
to lend its approval to the use of the investigatory power for these
purposes, for in practice no investigation in which either of these
motives is present is ever utterly devoid of legislative possibilities. It has always seemed enough to the courts that a specific
inquiry might result in legislation; speculation as to other motives
or results has seemed superfluous. Morever, since 1880 no specific
inquiry has been disapproved by the Supreme Court on the ground
that it was a "fruitless" one that could not result in legislation.
While the range of subject matter that has sooner or later been
brought within the scope of its inquisitorial power by Congress
has indeed been wide, it is doubtful whether Congress has ever
conducted an investigation that could not possibly have supplied
information for some kind of legislation of undoubted constitutionalityY Accordingly, the principle that a congressional investigation must be a potentially fruitful one has not had much meaning in practice, and it may be doubted whether the courts will
ever find occasion to use it as the basis for a ruling that a specific
inquiry is unlawful because of its subject matter. 10
The Supreme Court has ruled that a congressional investigating committee is limited in its examination of witnesses to
the asking of questions pertinent or relevant to the matter under
inquiry. In particular, the Court has reiterated the point that a
witness need not answer a question that has no other purpose
than to probe into his personal or private affairs. And yet, apart
9. In the Jay Cooke investigation the legislative possibilities were obvious.

To mention only one possibility, a law might have been passed to prevent
subsequent "improvident deposits" of federal funds by government officials.
10. It should be added that the Supreme Court has approved the use of
the investigative power by Congress for other purposes than supplying information for legislation. Congress may also seek information essential to a
"wise" decision as to the expulsion of a member of the impeachment or conviction of a public officer. See In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661 (1897) In which
the Court held that the Senate might properly authorize an investigation into
charges that certain senators "were yielding to corrupt influences in the
consideration of . . . legislation." The Court has also approved the use of the
investigating power to scrutinize campaign expenditures in a congressional
election looking toward a possible refusal to seat the winning candidate.
Barry v. Cunningham, 279 U. S. 597 (1929). On the other hand, the Court has
held that Congress's power to punish private persons for contempt does not
extend to a situation where a libelous attack is made on a congressional
agency in a newspaper, there being no indication of a resulting immediate
obstruction of the legislative process. Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521 (1917).
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from the Kilbourn case, the Court has never ruled that the par-.
ticular questions asked a witness before a committee were not
pertinent; nor has it ever ruled that a particular inquiry encroached improperly upon a witness's privacy. But the Court has
frequently warned against these forbidden practices. In the McGrain case the Court said, ". . a witness rightfully may refuse
to answer where the bounds of the [investigatory] power are
exceeded or the questions are not pertinent to the matter under
inquiry." 11 Two years later in 1929 in Sinclair v. United States,
it added, "It has always been recognized in this country, and it
is well to remember, that few if any of the rights of the people
guarded by fundamental law are of greater importance to their
happiness and safety than the right to be exempt from all unauthorized, arbitrary, or unreasonable inquiries and disclosures in
respect of their personal and private affairs." i2. But in both of
these cases, after having uttered these inspiring generalizations
concerning the right of witnesses to refuse to cooperate when
confronted by lines of inquiry encroaching upon their purely private affairs, the Court went on to hold that the actual inquiries
and questions involved were proper. 13 Indeed, it may be asked
whether the ruling of the Court that an investigating committee is
limited to the asking of pertinent questions can have much vitality in practice. The operation of the rule is such that a substantial
burden is placed on the witness who refuses to answer questions.
He takes a large risk, for, unless he is sustained by the courts in
his assertion that the questions are impertinent, punishment for
contempt will be his fate. This is a risk that most witnesses will
be reluctant to take, particularly if the stubborn fact is brought
to their attention by their attorneys that there is still not a single
case in which the courts have ruled that a committee has actually
exceeded the bounds of its authority by asking improper ques4
tions.1
11. 273 U.S. 135, 176 (1927).
12. 279 U.S. 263, 292 (1929). In Kibourn v. Thompson the Court had said,
"We are sure that no person can be punished for contumacy as a witness
before either House, unless his testimony is required in a matter into which
that House has jurisdiction to inquire, and we feel equally sure that neither
of these bodies possesses the general power of making inquiry into the private
affairs of the citizen." 103 U.S. 168, 190 (1880).
13. In the Sinclair case the witness appeared before a Senate committee
but refused to answer certain questions. The Court ruled that the questions
were pertinent and should have been answered. Daugherty refused to appear
before the congressional committee that had subpoenaed him; thus there
was no actual issue of the pertinency of questions in that case.
14. A possible exception to this is found in In re Pacific Railway Commission, 32 Fed. 241 (N.D. Calif. 1887). In this case a federal circuit court refused
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Constitutional law with respect to the procedural side of congressional investigations is less easily stated than is the law concerning their substantive side. In spite of the fact that the actual
language of the Constitution suggests otherwise it has long been
accepted that some, if not all, of the procedural guarantees of the
Bills of Rights do apply to congressional investigations. But an
accurate statement of the specific guarantees that do apply and
of the effect or extent of their application is very difficult to
make. On one hand, there is not the slightest suggestion in any
court ruling that the Sixth Amendment guarantee that an accused
person "shall . . . have the assistance of counsel for his defense"
requires a congressional committee to permit witnesses to enjoy
such assistance. On the other hand, while there is no clear-cut
ruling to this effect, the courts have intimated that the ban of the
Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures
does bind such committees as well as ordinary law-enforcement
officers. 15
to aid the Pacific Railway Commission, which had been created by act of
Congress to conduct an investigation of certain railroads, to compel Leland
Stanford to answer certain questions. But see Nutting, Freedom of Silence:
Constitutional Protection Against Governmental Intrusions in Political Affairs, 47 Mich. L. Rev. 181 (1948). This author holds "the so-called limitation of
pertinence has been reduced to almost complete insignificance." (Id. at 216.)
The general inclination of the courts to grant legislative, committees very
considerable leeway in fixing the bounds for pertinency is illustrated by the
opinion of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in the case of
Townsend v. United States. It will be recalled that Dr. Townsend appeared
before a House committee which was investigating old age pension plans but
took offense at the proceedings and walked out of the committee room. Townsend was charged with contempt and convicted. In its decision upholding
this conviction the court of appeals said:
"A legislative inquiry may be as broad, as searching, and as exhaustive
as is necessary to make effective the constitutional powers of Congress....
A judicial inquiry relates to a case, and the evidence to be admissible must be
measured by the narrow limits of the pleadings. A legislative inquiry anticipates all possible cases which may arise thereunder, and the evidence admissible must be responsive to the scope of the inquiry, which generally is very
broad. Many a witness in a judicial inquiry has, no doubt, been embarrassed
and irritated by questions which to him seemed incompetent, irrelevant, immaterial, and impertinent. But that is not a matter for a witness finally to
decide. Because a witness could not understand the purpose of crossexamination, he would not be justified in leaving a courtroom. The orderly
processes of judicial determination do not permit the exercise of such discretion by a witness. The orderly processes of legislative inquiry require that
the committee shall determine such questions for itself. Within the realm of
legislative discretion, the exercise of good taste and good judgment in the
examination of witnesses must be entrusted to those who have been vested
with authority to conduct such investigations." 95 F. 2d 352, 361 (D.C. Cir.
1938).
15. There is no ruling by an appellate court that the Fourth Amendment
controls congressional committees. In Strawn v. Western Union Telegraph
Company, 3 U.S. Law Week 646 (D.C. Cir. 1936) a District of Columbia court
granted an injunction to restrain the Western Union Company from handing
over to a Senate committee all copies of telegrams sent or received by the
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Much of the argument concerning the applicability of the
procedural clauses of the Bill of Rights to congressional investigating committees has centered in the self-incrimination clause
of the Fifth Amendment which says, "No person . . . shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."
On its face this language would seem to have no bearing whatsoever upon the status of a witness before a legislative committee. Indeed, read literally the clause would seem to restrict the
right solely to the defendant in a criminal case actually under
way. 10 However, tradition and precedent have long given the
right to be free from self-incrimination a broader application than
is suggested by the language of the Fifth Amendment. It is now
generally recognized that the right may be claimed, by witnesses
as well as the defendant in a criminal case, by parties and witnesses in civil cases, and by witnesses in non-judicial proceedings,
to justify a refusal to give any testimony that might be used as
a basis for later criminal proceedings against them. 17 Moreover,
it was long ago asserted that the right might be claimed by a
witness before a congressional committee. Indeed, as early as
1857, Congress endeavored to remove the threat to legislative
plaintiff during a ten-month period on the ground that the subpoena duces
tecum issued by the committee violated the Fourth Amendment. See also

the New York Times, March 12, 1936; McGeary, The Developments of Congressional Investigative Power, 106-108 (1940); Hearst v. Black, 87 F. 2d 68
(D.C. Cir. 1936).
16. Edward S. Corwin has written, "Considered in the light shed by
grammar and the dictionary, the words of the self-incrimination clause
appear to signify simply that nobody shall be compelled to give oral testimony against himself in a criminal proceeding under way in which he is
defendant." (The Supreme Court's Construction of the Self-Incrimination
Clause, 29 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 2 [1930]. Reprinted in 2 Selected Essays on Constitutional Law 1398, 1399 [1938]). E. M. Morgan, professor at Harvard and
Vanderbilt Law Schools, has written, "If this language were to be construed
as fixing the limits of the privilege without regard to the existing precedents,
It would be difficult to contend that it could be legitimately claimed in a civil
action in law or equity, or in any proceeding which was not to be used as a
foundation for a criminal prosecution." The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 34 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 23 (1949).
17. Wigmore, the great authority on evidence, says the protection of the
privilege against self-incrimination "extends to all manner of proceedings in
which testimony is to be taken, whether litigious or not, and whether 'ex
parte' or otherwise. It therefore applies in . . . investigations by a legislature
or a body having legislative functions, and in investigations by administrative
officials." 8 Wigmore, Evidence (3 ed. 1940) § 2252(c). Supreme Court cases
in which broad protection of the privilege has been recognized are: Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (privilege applied to statutory proceedings
for forfeiture of goods); Conselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892); Blau v.
United States, 19 U.S. Law Week 4062, 4094 (1950, 1951) (privilege applied to
grand jury proceedings); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896) (privilege
assumed to apply to Interstate Commerce Commission proceedings); McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34 (1924) (privilege applied to bankruptcy
proceedings).
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inquiries, which repeated assertion of the claim might entail, by
enacting legislation granting witnesses absolute immunity against
prosecution for any crimes revealed by their testimony and in
turn compelling them to testify.', It took this step even though
there was no Supreme Court ruling that the right not to testify
against oneself could be claimed by a witness before a congressional committee. In fact, there has been no such flat ruling from
the Court even to this day, although, as one authority has pointed
out, there are Supreme Court opinions whose "fair inference...
is that the privilege as established in the Fifth Amendment protects witnesses in congressional investigations as fully as in judicial proceedings." 19 At any rate for at least a century Congress
seems to have recognized the right of witnesses to refuse to testify before its committees on this ground, and it has either
attempted to compel testimony by granting immunity, or has
allowed witnesses to assert the right without challenge, even
though the right rests on no more than "assumptions and intima20
tions" in Supreme Court decisions.
18. 11 Stat. 155 (1857). Chief Justice Vinson has stated that the 1857
statute was "designed on the one hand to compel the testimony of witnesses
and on the other hand to protect them from prosecution for crimes revealed
by their testimony." (United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323 [1950].) The
Supreme Court has held that Congress may withdraw the privilege against
self-incrimination by granting a witness before the Interstate Commerce
Commission complete immunity against any prosecution on account of any
transaction to which he may testify. That the statute could not also shield
him against personal disgrace or opprobrium was held immaterial. (Brown
v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 [1896].) See also Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906). In
the latter case the Supreme Court said, ". . . if the criminality has already
been taken away the [5th] amendment cases to apply. The criminality provided against is a present, not a past criminality, which lingers only as a
memory, and involves no present danger of prosecution. . . . It is here that
the law steps in and says that if the offense be outlawed or pardoned, or its
criminality has been removed by statute, the amendment ceases to apply."
(201 U.S. 43, 67.)
19. E. M. Morgan, supra note 16, at 31. Professor Morgan points out that
there are square rulings in the state courts to the effect that state legislative
committees are bound by the self-incrimination clauses in state constitutions.
See Emery's Case, 107 Mass. 172 (1871); Matter of Doyle, 257 N.Y. 244, 177
N.E. 489 (1931).
20. E. M. Morgan, supra note 16, at 33. Actually Congress seems to have
gone even further than have the courts in recognizing the right. Professor
Corwin points out that with respect to a witness in a judicial proceeding,
"The privilege must . . . be claimed in each instance, and by the witness
himself, and must in each instance be passed upon by the Court-the witness
is not the final judge. Also, while the claim must relate to a past act, it must
not be one that is so long past that under the statute of limitations the witness
is no longer subject to prosecution on account of it." (Corwin, supra note 16,
at 1426.) The rulings of the federal courts concerning the circumstances in
which a party or witness to a judicial proceeding may properly refuse to
answer questions on the ground of self-incrimination are not as clear as they
might be. In the early circuit court case, Burr v. United States, 25 Fed. Cas.
No. 14,692e, at 38, 40, Chief Justice Marshall said: "When a question is
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The legislative grant of absolute immunity against later prosecution for crime given by Congress in 1857 to witnesses before its
committees was allowed to stand for only five years. In 1862 this
provision of the Act of 1857 which had been passed by overwhelming majorities in both houses was unanimously repealed
propounded, it belongs to the court to consider and to decide whether any
direct answer to it can implicate the witness. If this be decided in the negative, then he may answer it without violating the privilege which is secured
to him by law. If a direct answer to it may criminate himself, then he must
be the sole judge what his answer would be. The court cannot participate
with him in this judgment, because they cannot decide on the effect of his
answer without knowing what it would be; and a disclosure of that fact to the
judges would strip him of the privilege which the law allows, and which he
claims."
In Mason v. United States, 244 U.S. 362 (1917), the Supreme Court held
that a witness before a grand jury might properly be directed to answer a
question which did not bear upon conduct which is criminal under the law,
and that continued refusal to answer such a question on the ground of selfincrimination might properly be punished as contempt. The court quoted
with approval the following language:
"... a Judge is, in our opinion, bound to Insist on a witness answering
unless he is satisfied that the answer will tend to place the witness in peril.
"Further than this, we are of opinion that the danger to be apprehended
must be real and appreciable, with reference to the ordinary operation of
law in the ordinary course of things-not a danger of an imaginary and
unsubstantial character, having reference to some extraordinary and barely
possible contingency, so improbable that no reasonable man would suffer
it to influence his conduct." 244 U.S. 362, 365-366.
On the other hand, the federal courts have frequently recognized that a
witness may claim the privilege with respect to a seemingly harmless question because of the relation it may bear, however distant, to criminal conduct.
Marshall pointed the way to this holding in his opinion in the Burr case:
"Many links frequently compose that chain of testimony which is necessary
to convict any individual of a crime. It appears to the court to be the true
sense of the rule that no witness is compellable to furnish any one of them
against himself. It is certainly not only a possible but a probable case that
a witness, by disclosing a single fact, may complete the testimony against
himself, and to every effectual purpose accuse himself as entirely as he would
by stating every circumstance which would be required for his conviction ...
It would seem, then, that the court ought never to compel a witness to give
an answer which discloses a fact that would form a necessary and essential
part of a crime which is punishable by the laws." 25 Fed. Cas. No. 14,692e,
at 40 (1807).
Recently the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit stated, after analyzing earlier federal rulings, ". . . we conclude the rule to be that the witness
is not the sole judge as to whether his answer will tend to incriminate him;
that when the question arises, it is for the court to determine from all the
facts whether the question is of such a nature as might reasonably be
expected to incriminate the witness, depending upon the answer thereto. If
there is reason to believe that the answer might tend to incriminate the
witness, he cannot be compelled to answer; neither can he be required to
state why the answer might tend to incriminate him, because that would in
Itself to some extent constitute giving testimony against himself. Furthermore, a witness may not be required to give an answer which furnishes a
link in a chain which would enable the Government to obtain the facts
showing his guilt of a crime." Rogers v. United States, 179 F. 2d 559, 562 (10th
Cir. 1950), affirmed 19 U.S. Law Week 4155 (February 26, 1951).
At other times the courts have suggested that a witness may arbitrarily
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on the ground that it had "cheated justice of its dues more often
than it had aided its administration, and its existence had come
to be a crying evil." 21 It was stated in debate that the provision
had operated in practice to induce criminals to appear before
congressional committees in order thereby to gain a general pardon for all offenses which they might mention in the course of
their testimony. Reference was made to specific instances in
which this result had prevailed during the five-year period the
22
act had been in effect.
In repealing the grant of absolute immunity Congress substituted for it a grant of relative immunity which has remained in
effect to the present time. The substitute provides only that the
actual testimony given by a witness shall not be used against him
as evidence in any subsequent criminal proceeding. It does not
protect the witness against prosecution for a crime that may be
disclosed in his testimony where law-enforcement officials can
find oth~er evidence than the witness's own testimony as a basis
for a case against him. Moreover, official papers or records produced by a witness are specifically exempted from the ban on
subsequent use as evidence in a criminal proceeding. In substituting a limited immunity for the earlier absolute immunity,
Congress nonetheless left in effect that portion of the 1857 statute
which stated flatly that. a witness might not refuse to testify or
to produce papers on the ground that such testimony or producrefuse to answer only those questions which on their face appear to call for
incriminating answers, and that he must assume the burden of proof with
respect to other questions and justify refusal to answer them by showing
that he has substantial reason to believe his answers will be Incriminating.
See United States v. Rosen, 174 F. 2d 187, 188 (2d Cir. 1949); Alexander v.
United States, 181 F. 2d 480, 482 (9th Cir. 1950).
It would appear that some if not all congressional committees have
allowed the witness himself to judge whether his testimony, if given, would
prove incriminating, and there does not appear to have been regular insistence

upon testimony being given where the statute of limitations has run concerning any crime that might be disclosed.
21. 12 Stat. 333 (1862), 2 U.S.C. § 193 (1938).

22. See Eberling, op. cit. supra note 2, at 319 et seq. Eberling quotes
Senator Wade as stating during debate over the repealer in the Senate:

. . . I

have not dared to enter upon certain investigations before a committee of
which I am a member, for the reason that the law as it is now, exculpates
great rascals from the responsibility they owe to the government, and gives
entire immunity to any man touching any matter you see fit to inquire of
him about. I wonder how such a law was ever passed. I never should have

believed that such a law was on your statute book if it had not been suggested
to me, and I had not found it.

I was astonished to find a law in existence

providing that if you inquired of any witness in regard to any delinquency
that had arisen, he should be exculpated from that moment from the consequences of his crime." (Id. at 322-323.)
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tion of papers would incriminate him. As found in the present
United States Code these two companion provisions are as follows:
"Title 18, Section 3486. No testimony given by a witness
before either House, or before any committee of either House,
or before any joint committee established by a joint or concurrent resolution of the two Houses of Congress, shall be
used as evidence in any criminal proceeding against him in
any court, except in a prosecution for perjury committed in
giving such testimony. But an official paper or record produced by him is not within the said privilege." 28
"Title 2, Section 193. No witness is privileged to refuse
to testify to any fact, or to produce any paper, respecting
which he shall be examined by either House of Congress, or
by any joint committee established by a joint or concurrent
resolution of the two Houses of Congress, or by any committee of either House, upon the ground that his testimony
to such fact or his production of such paper may tend to disgrace him or otherwise render him infamous." 24
There has been a good deal of doubt about the constitutionality of this arrangement whereby a grant of partial immunity
is combined with an absolute denial of the right to refuse to
testify on grounds of self-incrimination. A somewhat similar
statutory arrangement with respect to testimony given in any
judicial proceeding was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court in 1892 in Counselan v. Hitchcock. The Court held that
the right established by the Fifth Amendment might be claimed
by a witness before a grand jury and that a statutory attempt to
withdraw the right by offering a witness immunity only against
the use of his own testimony in a subsequent criminal proceeding
25
against him could not meet the test of constititionality.
23. As amended 62 Stat. 683 (1948).
Stat. 333 (1862).

Derived from 11 Stat. 156 (1857), 12

24. As amended 52 Stat. 942 (1938). Derived from 12 Stat. 333 (1862).
25. 142 U.S. 547 (1892). See the discussion in Eberling, op. cit. supra note 2,
at 401 et seq. The statutory provision involved in the Counselman case was
Rev. Stat. § 860 (1875), which reads as follows:
"No pleading of a party, nor any discovery or evidence obtained from a
party or witness by means of a judicial proceeding in this or any other
foreign country, shall be given in evidence, or in any manner used against
him or his property or estate, in any court of the United States, In any
criminal proceeding, or for the enforcement of any penalty or forfeiture:
Provided, That this section shall not exempt any party or witness from prosecution and punishment for perjury committed in discovering or testifying
as aforesaid."
Section 860 is comparable to the present Section 3486 of Title 18 of the
United States Code. Indeed, the latter provision of law is derived from
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By analogy the legislation pertaining to witnesses before con26
gressional committees has seemed to have the same deficiency,
and accordingly, congressional committees have been reluctant
to insist that a witness must testify when he offers self-incrimination as an excuse for remaining silent. Of course, it should be
recognized that a witness who offers this excuse usually discredits
himself in the eyes of the public, for in effect he admits he has
been guilty of wrong-doing.
The way in which the courts have gained the opportunity
to review the record of investigating committees, both with
respect to substance and procedure, should be noted. With rare
exceptions cases presenting such an opportunity have come to
the courts as a result of the exercise of the contempt power by
Congress. Where witnesses have refused to cooperate with investigating committees, conviction for contempt of Congress has traditionally been the price such witnesses have paid. Such a conviction, in turn, has often afforded a witness the opportunity to
challenge in the courts the propriety of the subject matter of an
investigation or of the procedures the committee making the
investigation has employed. Where such challenges have been
made the courts have, since 1880 at least, been ready to subject
the investigation to the full measure of judicial review, although
having insisted upon the right to scrutinize this activity of a
Section 859 of the Revised Statutes where it was definitely a companion to
Section 860. But whereas Section 3486 is today coupled with a statutory provision flatly withdrawing the privilege against self-incrimination from witnesses before congressional committees (12 U.S.C. § 193 [1946]), Section 860
of the Revised Statutes was not accompanied by a similar provision purporting to withdraw the privilege from witnesses before grand juries or other
judicial agencies. Actually it would seem as though it is Section 193 that is of
doubtful constitutionality, and not Section 3486. The defect in Section 3486 is
that it does not grant a broad enough Immunity to cancel the Fifth Amendment privilege. But it does not in its own language claim to do that. Thus it
might properly be regarded as a harmless, ineffectual, but not unconstitutional
statute. As a matter of fact a careful reading of the Counselman opinion
leaves one in some doubt as to whether the Court did not find Section 860
harmless and ineffectual rather than unconstitutional. In a long opinion the
only passage that bears on the possible unconstitutionality of Section 860 is
the following: "We are clearly of the opinion that no statute which leaves
the party or witness subject to prosecution after he answers the criminating
question put to him, can have the effect of supplanting the privilege conferred by the Constitution of the United States. Section 860 of the Revised
Statutes does not supply a complete protection from all the perils against
which the constitutional prohibition was designed to guard, and is not a full
substitute for that prohibition. In view of the constitutional provision, a
statutory enactment, to be valid, must afford absolute immunity against future
prosecution, for the offence to which the question relates." 142 U.S. 547,
585-586.
26. Chief Justice Vinson's opinion in United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323
(1950) implies the unconstitutionality of this legislation.
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collateral branch of the government, the courts, as has been seen,
have then consistently ruled against the witness and for the
Congress.
The right of Congress to punish a private person for conduct
deemed contemptuous of it was recognized by the Supreme Court
as early as 1821 in Anderson v. Dunn. In that case the Court
upheld the power of the House of Representatives to arrest and
punish a private person who had attempted to bribe one of its
members. The Court declared this was an implied common law
power essential to the effective exercise of Congress's express
powers.2 7 Until 1857 the procedure in such cases was to bring
the accused individual before the bar of the Senate or the House
where he was, in effect, tried. If a finding of guilt resulted, punishment might be imposed, ranging from a mere reprimand as
in Anderson's case, to imprisonment at the hands of the House
or Senate Sergeant at Arms for the remainder of the session.
In the 1857 legislation, already referred to, Congress took the step
of defining contempt of Congress as a statutory offense against
the United States, thus making it possible to turn a contumacious
person over to law-enforcement officials for prosecution in the
courts. Seemingly this step was taken not so much to provide a
statutory definition of contempt of Congress which all could see,
as to establish a greater and more effective penalty, since the
Supreme Court had inferred in the Anderson case that Congress
itself could not order a person, declared by it to be guilty of contempt, imprisoned beyond the duration of the current session. 2
Under the Act of 1857, contempt of Congress was declared to be
a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not more than $1,000 nor
less than $100, and imprisonment for not more than one year nor
less than one month. The text of this portion of the Act which
has now become Section 192 of Title 2 of the United States Code is:
"Every person who having been summoned as a witness
by the authority of either House of Congress to give testimony
or to produce papers upon any matter under inquiry before
either House, or any joint committee established by a joint
or concurrent resolution of the two Houses of Congress, or
27. 19 U.S. 204 (1821).
28. See Eberling, op. cit. supra note 2, at 302 et seq. The Supreme Court
had observed in Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. 204, 231 (1821): "'a period is
imposed by the nature of things; since the existence of the power that
imprisons is indispensable to its continuance and although the legislative
power continues perpetual, the legislative body ceases to exist at the moment
of its adjournment or periodical dissolution. It follows, that imprisonment
must terminate with that adjournment.'"
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any committee of either House of Congress, willfully makes
default, or who, having appeared, refuses to answer any
question pertinent to the question under inquiry, shall be
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of
not more than $1,000 nor less than $100 and imprisonment
in a common jail for not less than one month nor more than
twelve months." 29
After the Dunn case in the 1820's most of the cases in which
private persons were held to be in contempt of Congress concerned uncooperative witnesses before investigating committees.
Although the Act of 1857 made it possible to turn such persons
over to the courts for trial, the two houses of Congress continued
in many instances to use their own direct power to declare such
persons guilty and to order them punished. One reason for this
continued adherence to the original procedure was that as long
as Congress retained an uncooperative witness in its custody there
was always the chance he would change his mind and agree to
testify, whereas once he was handed over to the courts this
chance came to an end. In other words, imprisonment for contempt by Congress itself may be used more readily for its coercive
effect, whereas imprisonment following a court trial is largely
punitive in its effect.8 0
The constitutionality of the Act of 1857 was upheld by the
Supreme Court in 1897 in In Re Chapman.31 Chapman appeared
in response to a subpoena as a witness before a Senate committee
which was investigating charges that certain senators had yielded
to corrupt influences in the consideration of tariff legislation. He
then refused to answer specific questions as to whether a brokerage firm of which he was a member had bought or sold sugar
stocks for any senator. As the result of this refusal to testify he
was successfully prosecuted under the Act of 1857. Indeed, it
appears Chapman was the first person ever to be indicted for
contempt of Congress under the Act of 1857, passed some forty
years earlier. 2 In reviewing the case the Supreme Court held
that Congress might properly define refusal of private persons
to testify before its committees as a misdemeanor. It also held
that this statutory offense did not take the place of the common
29.
30.
31.
32.
(1907).

As amended 52 Stat. 942 (1938). Derived from 11 Stat. 155 (1857).
See Eberling, op cit. supra note 2, at 316 et seq.
166 U.S. 661 (1897).
2 Hinds, Precedents of the House of Representatives, 1076, § 1613
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laW offense recognized in the Anderson case, but was merely a
supplement to the latter. Indeed, the Court implied that were
Congress to attempt by statute to vest in the courts exclusive
power to try witnesses before its committees for contempt the
result would be an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power
to the judiciary. The Court also stated that were Congress first
to punish a contumacious witness itself, and then turn him over
to the courts for prosecution and possible punishment such procedure would not violate the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth
Amendment. 3 3 It may be noted that the Chapman decision did
not establish the authority of Congress to seek factual information in aid of legislation by means of investigations. Rather it
approved the use of the investigation as a means of obtaining
information concerning the conduct of its own members looking
toward the possibility of their expulsion.
In recent years the House and Senate have depended heavily
upon proceedings under the Act of 1857 as a sanction to compel
private persons to cooperate with their investigating committees,
and have seldom invoked their own power to punish contumacious witnesses directly.3 4 It should be noted that while the relevant legislation states that when the facts concerning a contumacious witness are reported to either House, the President of
the Senate or the Speaker shall certify the case to the district
attorney for the District of Columbia for presentation to the grand
jury, the custom has been for the presiding officers to wait until
the Senate or House by majority vote direct them to take this
step.
Because a review of proceedings in contempt cases has been
33. On this point the Court said, "It is improbable that in any case cumulative penalties would be imposed, whether by way of punishment merely, or
of eliciting the answers desired, but it is quite clear that the contumacious
witness is not subjected to jeopardy twice for the same offense, since the same
act may be an offense against one jurisdiction and also an offense against
another; and indictable statutory offenses may be punished as such, while the

offenders may likewise be subjected to punishment for the acts as contempts,
the two being diverso intuito and capable of standing together." 166 U.S. 661,
672 (1897).

34. An exception is seen In the case of Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U.S.
125 (1935). MacCracken was cited by a Senate resolution in 1934 to appear
before the bar of the Senate to show cause why he should not be punished
for contempt of the Senate because he had destroyed certain papers which

he had been subpoenaed to produce before a Senate committee investigating
air mail contracts. MacCracken sought protection in the courts against
arrest by Jurney, the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms, arguing that the power of
the Senate to punish a contumacious witness could be used only for its
coercive effect and did not extend to punishment for a past and completed
act. The Supreme Court rejected this argument and upheld the authority

of the Senate to bring MacCracken before its bar to be punished for contempt.
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almost the only method by which the courts have gained the
opportunity to pass generally upon the propriety of congressional
investigations, the means has always been available to Congress
to avoid judicial supervision of this activity merely by refraining from contempt proceedings against recalcitrant witnesses.
On the other hand, unless Congress takes steps to punish at
least an occasional uncooperative witness, its investigating committees might ultimately be faced by a wholesale refusal of witnesses to testify.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL CASE AGAINST THE UN-AMERICAN
ACTIVITIES COMMITTEE

In carrying their case against the Un-American Activities
Committee to the courts, the Committee's opponents have raised
virtually every constitutional point that has ever been made
against any earlier congressional committee, and have also devised several new arguments. As has been true of previous attacks
upon the investigatory power, the arguments have fallen into two
categories, one including attacks upon the Committee's general
authority to investigate subversive activity, and the other attacks
upon the Committee's specific policies and procedures. Unfortunately, consideration of these arguments by the courts has not
been very orderly or systematic, nor has it resulted in a series
of clear-cut legal rulings. There has been a good deal of disagreement between different courts hearing the same case, and even
between the justices of a single court. Moreover, the opinions,
majority and dissenting alike, have been more than ordinarily
discursive and it is not easy to set forth their substance in orderly
fashion.
At this point a summary may be provided of the different
legal and constitutional attacks that have been made upon the
Un-American Activities Committee, although it should be added
that some of these arguments have not yet been recognized or
passed upon by the appellate courts. The Committee has been
challenged in the following respects:
1. The general grant of investigating power made to it by
the House of Representatives as lying outside the legislative authority (or any other kind of authority) of Congress.
2. The specific matter under inquiry in particular hearings
as not encompassed by the investigating power granted
to it.
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3. Specific questions asked a witness as not pertinent to the
matter under inquiry.
4. Invasion of private affairs.
5. Its general grant of power, or its use of this power to
undertake a specific inquiry or to ask specific questions,
as encroaching upon rights safeguarded by the First
Amendment.
6. Its efforts to obtain evidence as contrary to the search
and seizure clause of the Fourth Amendment.
7. Its efforts to obtain testimony as contrary to the selfincrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment.
8. Its general grant of power as contrary to the due process
clause of the Fifth Amendment on the ground of vagueness.
9. Its use of authority in allegedly discriminatory fashion
as violative of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.
10. Its treatment of a witness as amounting to a criminal
prosecution without trial by jury in violation of the Sixth
Amendment. (A correlative challenge has been that its
treatment of a witness amounts to a bill of attainder, in
violation of section nine of Article One of the Constitution.)
11. The legality of the proceedings at a particular session of
the Committee on the ground that a quorum of its members was not present.
12. The legality of the proceedings on the ground that members of the Committee have been improperly elected to
Congress.
Before attempting to set forth in any orderly fashion the
findings of the courts in cases in which the Committee has been
challenged with respect to any of the points listed above a brief
description may be made of the cases themselves and of the
manner in which they arose. In a two and a half year period
between December, 1947, and April i950 five cases growing out
of the work of the Un-American Activities Committee were
decided finally at the court of appeals level and four more reached
the Supreme Court for decision.8 5 The cases that did not go
35. The cases in the first group were: United States v. Josephson, 165 F.
2d 82 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied 333 U.S. 838, 858 (1948), 335 U.S. 899 (1948);
Barsky et al. v. United States, 167 F. 2d 241 (D.C. Cir. 1948), cert. denied 334

U.S. 843 (1948); Eisler v. United States, 170 F. 2d 273 (D.C. Cir. 1948), cert.
granted 335 U.S. 857 (1948), dismissed as moot 338 U.S. 189 (1949); Lawson v.
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beyond the courts of appeals raised the most basic issues concerning the law of congressional investigations. The Supreme
Court was seemingly content to let the lower courts settle these
issues since it refused to review any of these cases.
Three of the cases grew out of the Committee's investigation
of the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee in 1946, two were
the results of investigations of the National Council of AmericanSoviet Friendship and the National Federation for Constitutional
Liberties in the same year, three were the result of the Committee's somewhat disorganized investigations in 1947 into the Communist Party and the comings and goings of certain international
Communists-chiefly Gerhart Eisler, and one was the product of
the Hollywood hearings later in 1947. As yet, the spectacular
Communist espionage hearings of 1948 have resulted in no litigation in which the authority of the House Committee has been
at issue, although a decision by the House of Representatives in
1950 to order the prosecution of certain witnesses who refused
in 1948 to testify on the ground of self-incrimination may well
ultimately produce such a result.
The three most important cases of this period were perhaps
United States v. Josephson, which was decided by the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit in 1947, Barsky v. United States,
which was decided by the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia in 1948, and Lawson v. United States, decided by the
latter court in 1949.
Leon Josephson appeared before the Committee in New York
in March, 1947, pursuant to a subpoena presumably to supply the
Committee with information concerning the methods by which
Eisler and other international Communists had been able to
enter and leave the United States with great ease. However,
upon his appearance he refused either to be sworn or to give
testimony. At the request of the Committee the House of Representatives cited Josephson for contempt. He was then indicted
and convicted in the federal district court in New York for violation of Section 192 of Title 2 of the United States Code. This
verdict was affirmed by the Court of Appeals by a two-to-one
United States, 176 F. 2d 49 (D.C. Cir. 1949), cert. denied 339 U.S. 934, 972 (1950);
Marshall v. United States, 176 F. 2d 473 (D.C. Cir. 1949), cert. denied 339 U.S.
933, 959 (1950).
The cases in the second group were: United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323
(1950), affirming 174 F. 2d 525 (D.C. Cir. 1949); United States v. Fleischman,
339 U.S. 349 (1950), affirming 174 F. 2d 519 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Dennis v. United
States, 339 U.S. 162 (1950), affirming 171 F. 2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1948); Morford v.
United States, 339 U.S. 258 (1950), affirming 176 F. 2d 54 (D.C. Cir. 1949).

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XI

vote. The majority consisted of Judges Swan and Chase, Judge
Charles E. Clark being the dissenter.
Dr. Edward K. Barsky, Chairman of the Joint Anti-Fascist
Refugee Committee, was subpoenaed together with Helen Bryan,
executive secretary of the organization, and fifteen members of
its executive board to appear before the House Committee in
February and April, 1946, and to bring with them the organization's books and records relating to the receipts and disbursements of money, and correspondence with persons in foreign
countries. All of the subpoenaed persons appeared, but none produced the requested documents. Thereupon, at the request of
the Committee all of the witnesses were cited for contempt by
the House and all were ultimately tried and convicted in the
courts under Section 192. Barsky and others appealed these verdicts to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia which
affirmed the verdicts by a two-to-one vote. The majority consisted of Judges Prettyman and Bennett Champ Clark, Judge
Edgerton being the dissenter.
John Howard Lawson and Dalton Trumbo were two of the
ten Hollywood witnesses who refused in October, 1947, to answer
questions put to them by the House Committee including the
now classic one, "Are you now or have you ever been a member
of the Communist Party?" All ten were cited for contempt by
the House but only Lawson and Trumbo were tried immediately
under Section 192 in a District of Columbia court, the trials of
the other eight being postponed by agreement until the validity
of the prosecution of Lawson and Trumbo could be tested in the
appellate courts. The two men were tried and convicted separately, but their appeals were heard jointly by the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia. The latter court affirmed
the verdicts unanimously.
Is the general authority of the Un-American Activities Committee valid? In virtually every case reaching the appellate
courts some effort has been made to challenge the general authority of the Un-American Activities Committee. For example, it
has repeatedly been argued that the Committee's enabling resolution and/or the actual record made by the Committee demonstrate that the Committee is not concerned with discovering
factual information that may serve as a basis for legislation, but
that instead its purpose is to influence public opinion or to expose
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allegedly subversive people to public condemnation. 6 The implication of this argument is that the Committee's general authority
has been granted or used for a purpose or purposes not hitherto
recognized as valid by the courts. The argument was specifically
rejected by the majority in the Josephson case. Judge Chase
stated, "...
we have no occasion now to decide whether a Congressional investigation may have exposure as its principal goal
... .It is sufficient to say that the authorizing statute contains
the declaration of Congress that the information sought is for a
legislative purpose and that fact is thus established for us. ..."
The Court called attention to the express congressional powers
to "provide for the common defense," "to raise and support
Armies," "to provide and maintain a,Navy," "to make Rules for
the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces,"
"to make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing Powers," to guarantee to every
state a republican form of government and to protect the states
against invasion and domestic violence, and suggested that their
exercise might be facilitated by the findings of an un-American
Activities investigation. It also took notice of the many types of
legislation that might properly be enacted by Congress as a
result of such an investigation, quoting with approval the following passage from a ruling of a federal district judge:
"That the subject of un-American and subversive activities is within the investigating power of the Congress is
obvious. Conceivably, information in this field may aid the
Congress in legislating concerning any one of many matters,
such as correspondence with foreign governments (U.S.C.A.
Title 18, § 5); seditions conspiracy (Id. § 6); prohibition of
undermining the morale of the armed forces (Id. § 9); suppression of advocacy of overthrow of the Government (Id.
§ 10); the registration of organizations carrying on certain
types of propaganda (Id. §§ 14 and 15); qualifications for
entering and remaining in Government service; the authorization of Governmental radio broadcasts to foreign countries;
and other innumerable topics. Similarly such information
may be helpful in appropriating funds." 37
36. See infra p. 309 for the text of the Committee's enabling resolution.
37. United States v. Josephson, 165 F. 2d 82, 89 (2d Cir. 1947). The quoted
passage is from a ruling by Judge Holtzoff in United States v. Bryan, 72 F.
Supp. 58, 62 (D.D.C. 1947).
In the Morford case the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
took notice of the argument that "when the subpoena was issued against the
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In spite of the fact that legislative recommendations have
not been a conspicuous feature of the reports of the Committee to
the House and also that very little actual legislation can be
traced to the work of the Committee, it is most unlikely that
the courts can be persuaded to show any sympathy for the
broad claim that the Committee's grant of authority or its exercise of that authority is unconcerned with the search for information in aid of legislation.3 8 There is little doubt that Congress's
defendant the House Committee on Un-American Activities had already
passed judgment on the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship and
was seeking to obtain names of persons participating in its activities and
supporting it financially and otherwise, for the sole purpose of adding such
names to its black-list and to facilitate the committee's efforts to destroy the
effectiveness of the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship in its
advocacy of American-Soviet Friendship by placing undue burdens upon such
continued advocacy," and that this meant "the committee was not acting in
furtherance of a legislative purpose...,." The court rejected this argument,
holding "that a legitimate legislative purpose is presumed when the general
subject of investigation is one concerning which Congress can legislate, and
when the information sought would materially aid its consideration." It
added, "That presumption arises here, and it cannot be rebutted by impugning the motives of individual members of the Committee." 176 F. 2d 54, 58
(D.C. Cir. 1949).
38. There is, of course, always the possibility that a particular line of
inquiry might be held deficient in the sense that no legislation could result
from it. But varied and unpredictable though the Committee's interests have
proved to be, it is doubtful whether the courts would hold that any of them
lay completely outside the scope of legislative possibilities. For example, in
undertaking to investigate the methods by which the Joint Anti-Fascist
Refugee Committee raised funds and the nature of its contacts with persons
in foreign lands it might seem as though the Committee had both exceeded
the limits of the authority granted to it and moved beyond the limits of
permissible congressional interest. But the court of appeals took notice of
the existence of such official bodies as UNRRA and the President's War
Relief Control Board, and held that they "clearly justified Congressional
inquiry into the disbursement abroad of private funds collected in this
country avowedly for relief but reasonably represented as being spent for
political purposes in Europe." Barsky v. United States, 167 F. 2d 241, 244
(1948). Again in the Morford case it was argued that the Committee's investigation of the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship was not "pertinent to any matter of inquiry committed to the Committee by Congress."
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia rejected the argument and
stated, "The National Council's unstinted praise of the communistic regime
in Russia, and- its comparison of Soviet official behavior with that of the
United States to the disparagement of the latter, led logically to the Committee's conclusion that here was such strong Indication of an attack on the
principle of our form of government as to justify inquiry" under the Committee's enabling resolution. 176 F. 2d 54, 56-57 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
In the Eisler case the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
affirmed Eisler's conviction under § 192 by a two-to-one vote. The dissenting
judge, Prettyman, stated that a judgment of acquittal should have been
directed on the ground the government had failed at Eisler's trial to show
that he had been summoned by the House Committee to testify on a matter
falling within its authority under its enabling resolution., Prettyman added,
"This record does not show, and we do not yet know, what it was that the
Committee wanted appellant to testify about." 170 F. 2d 273, 284 (D.C. Cir.
1948). The majority does not appear to have given any consideration to this
point.
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legislative, authority under the Constitution is such that it may
properly authorize an investigation into the general field of subversive activity as a means of securing factual information in
39
aid of legislation.
Has the Committee's substantive authority brought it into
conflict with the First Amendment? A more promising attack
upon the House Committee has been that the specific authority
granted to it brings it into conflict with the First Amendment.
But this attack, too, has thus far failed in the courts.
The argument that the Committee has encroached upon the
freedom of speech, press, and assembly guaranties of the First
Amendment has been formulated in various ways. It has been
argued that Congress's authority to undertake an investigation
of subversive activity is limited by the clear and present danger
doctrine. According to this doctrine Congress may not curb freedom of expression or related rights except where there is evidence that the exercise of such rights is creating a clear and
present danger of a substantive evil that Congress has authority
to prevent. 40 More specifically, it is argued that the investigating
39. In the Barsky case the majority states, "We think that inquiry into
threats to the existing form of government by extra-constitutional processes
of change is a power of Congress under its prime obligation to protect for
the people that machinery of which it is a part.
167 F. 2d 241, 246
(D.C. Cir. 1948).
40. The first formulation of the clear and present danger doctrine was by
Justice Holmes in the Court opinion in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47,
52 (1919): "The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a
man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic. It does not
even protect a man from an injunction against uttering words that may have
all the effect of force. Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 439.
The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger
that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to
prevent."
In Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376-78 (1927), Justice Brandeis in
a concurring opinion said, "To justify suppression of free speech there must
be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if free speech is
practiced. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the danger
apprehended .isimminent. There must be reasonable ground to believe that
the evil to be prevented is a serious one. . . . no danger flowing from speech
can be deemed clear and present, unless the incidence of the evil apprehended
is so imminent that it may befall before there is opportunity for full discussion .... Moreover, even imminent danger cannot justify resort to prohibition of these functions essential to effective democracy, unless the evil
apprehended is relatively serious .... The fact that speech is likely to result
in some violence or in destruction of property is not enough to justify its
suppression. There must be the probability of serious injury to the State."
In Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263 (1941), Justice Black in the
Court opinion observes, "What finally emerges from the 'clear and present
danger' cases is a working principle that the substantive evil [that the
legislature seeks to prevent by statute] must be extremely serious and the
degree of imminence extremely high before utterances can be punished."
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power is subject to the same limitations as the legislating power,
and that in the absence of evidence that the nation is endangered
by subversive activity the House Committee may not undertake
a program of thought control by such means as exposure and
publicity where legislation attempting the same thing would most
certainly be held to violate the First Amendment. A totally different line of argument under the First Amendment has been
that the Amendment establishes a right of privacy, or a right to
remain silent, particularly as to an individual's political beliefs
or affiliations, which rights have been violated by the Committee's
oft-repeated demand that its witnesses state whether or not they
are members of the Communist Party. One observer has pointed
out, "Paradoxically enough, the 'right' to be silent has been vociferously asserted by some of our most loquacious citizens." 41
However formulated, arguments based upon the First Amendment have consistently been rejected by the courts. In both the
Josephson and Barsky cases the majorities held that a congressional committee may properly investigate the propaganda activities of political groups to determine whether there does exist a
clear and present danger to American democracy that Congress
may wish to meet through legislation. The majority judges in
both cases refused to concede that the Un-American Activities
Committee was itself attempting to meet the threat through
exposure and publicity, or to decide whether this threat was
sufficiently serious to constitute a clear and present danger. Instead, they implied that any such direct action by the Committee
was incidental to its main purpose-securing information that
would enable Congress to decide whether remedial legislation was
needed. And the judicial position in these two cases was that the
search for information must necessarily be allowed to reach wider
limits than can be encompassed by legislation itself. The reasoning in the majority opinions runs somewhat as follows: A statute
restrictive of speech or political activity is valid only when aimed
at a clear and present danger. But the questioning of witnesses
before a congressional committee concerning their political or
propagandist activities must necessarily be broad where the purpose is to discover whether such activity does in fact create a
clear and present danger. It will be time enough to consider
whether a statute growing out of the investigation perchance
violates the First Amendment, when such a statute is passed. In
the meantime the courts must presume that Congress will not be
41. Nutting, op. cit., p. 181.
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encouraged by the investigation at hand to pass unconstitutional
legislation.

42

Similarly, the courts have rejected the notion that there is
any absolute right under the First Amendment to remain silent
as to one's political affiliations or activities. Insofar as such
affiliations or activities may affect the public Welfare, Congress
may properly seek information as to their nature and extent, and
private persons must cooperate with such a search. In the Lawson
case the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia observed
that it is "beyond dispute that the motion picture industry plays
a critically prominent role in the molding of public opinion,"
took notice of "the current ideological struggle between communistic-thinking and democratic-thinking peoples of the world,"
and concluded "it is absurd to argue ... that questions asked men,

who, by their authorship of the scripts, vitally influence the ultimate production of motion pictures seen by millions, which questions require disclosure of whether or not they are or ever have
been Communists, are not pertinent questions." And for good
measure, the Court added, "Indeed, it is hard to envisage how
there could be any more pertinent question" where a committee
43
of Congress is investigating un-American propaganda activities.
42. In the Josephson case the majority states, "The power of Congress
to gather facts of the most intense public concern, such as these, is not diminished by the unchallenged right of individuals to speak their minds within
lawful limits. When speech, or propaganda, or whatever it may at the
moment be called, clearly presents an immediate danger to national security,
the protection of the First Amendment ceases. Congress can then legislate.
In deciding what to do, however, it may necessarily be confronted with the
difficult and complex task of determining how far it can go before it transgresses the boundaries established by the Constitution." 165 F. 2d 82, 91 (2d
Cir. 1947).
In the Barsky case the majority states, "In our view, it would be sheer
folly as a matter of governmental policy for an existing government to refrain
from inquiry into potential threats to its existence or security until danger
was clear and present. And for the judicial branch of government to hold
the legislative branch to be without power to make such inquiry until the
danger is clear and present, would be absurd. How, except upon inquiry,
would the Congress know whether the danger is clear and present? There is
a vast difference between the necessities for inquiry and the necessities for
action. The latter may be only when danger is clear and present, but the
former is when danger is reasonably represented as potential.
"There was justification here, within the bounds of the foregoing restriction, for the exercise of the power of inquiry. The President . . . has
announced to the Congress the conclusion that aggressive tendencies of
totalitarian regimes imposed on free peoples threaten the security of the
United States, and he mentioned the activities of Communists in that connection. . . . These culminations of responsible governmental consideration sufficiently demonstrate the necessity for Congressional knowledge of the subject
and so justify its course in inquiring into it." 167 F. 2d 241, 246-247 (D.C.
Cir. 1948).
43. 176 F. 2d 49, 53 (D.C. Cir. 1949). In the Josephson case the majority
says, "Surely matters which potentially affect the very survival of our Gov-
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It has also been argued that the Committee's enabling resolution violates the First Amendment under the rule that a statute
which impinges on rights protected by the Amendment is void
on its face if it is worded so broadly as to permit within the scope
of its language the punishment of conduct clearly protected by
the Amendment. 44 But the courts have been unwilling to apply
this stringent rule to the resolution or statute by which a congressional investigation is authorized. There is no case concerning
the Un-American Activities Committee in which the majority
has given this argument careful consideration. But in the Barsky
case, having noted the argument, Judge Prettyman asserted,
"There is a difference between the particularity required in the
specification of a criminal act and that required in the authoriza-

tion of an investigation.

.

.. ,,41

Have the Committee's activities encroached upon rights safeguarded by the Fifth Amendment? At least three arguments
against the activity of the House Committee have been based upon
the Fifth Amendment. The first, and perhaps most serious, has
been that since the resolution establishing the Committee defines
the area of its investigative powers in exceedingly vague and
nebulous terms any attempt to use criminal statutes to punish
persons who fail to cooperate with the Committee is unconstitutional on the traditional ground that proscribed criminal conduct
ernment are by no means the purely personal concern of anyone. And investigations into such matters are inquiries relating to the personal affairs of
private individuals only to the extent that those individuals are a part of the
Government as a whole. The doctrine of Kilbourn v. Thompson .. . is, then,
not here involved." 165 F. 2d 82, 89 (2d Cir. 1947).
44. This rule finds expression in Winters v. New York in the Court
opinion by Justice Reed: "It is settled that a statute so vague and indefinite
...
as to permit within the scope of its language the punishment of incidents
fairly within the protection of the guarantee of free speech is void, on its
face .... 333 U.S. 507, 509 (1948).
See also Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931); Herndon v.
Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 258-259 (1937); and Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88,
97-98 (1940).
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has sometimes upheld statutes,
whose broad wording raised doubts about their constitutionality, as long as
they had been narrowly applied in the cases bringing them to the Court's
attention. For example, in the Chapman case the Court noted the argument
that because the statute defining contemptuous conduct by a witness before
a congressional committee as a misdemeanor referred to "any" matter under
inquiry it was "fatally defective because too broad and unlimited In its
extent," but rejected this argument preferring instead to follow the rule
"that statutes should receive a sensible construction, such as will effectuate
the legislative intention, and, if possible, so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd
conclusion .. " 166 U.S. 661, 667 (1897).
45. 167 F. 2d 241, 248 (D.C. Cir. 1948). Judge Edgerton in his dissenting
opinion gave this argument more careful, and sympathetic, consideration. See
infra p. 321.
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must be "set forth with clarity, so that the person to whom it
applies may determine what conduct is legal and what is not." 46
Persons subpoenaed to appear as witnesses before congressional
committees are clearly entitled on the basis of Supreme Court
decisions in the Kilbourn, Daugherty, and Sinclair cases to refuse
to give testimony if the subject matter of the investigation lies
outside the scope of Congress's legitimate interests, and they are
entitled to refuse to answer specific questions which are not in
fact pertinent to the legitimate subject matter of an inquiry. It
has been argued that the subject matter of the un-American
activities investigation is so vaguely defined that a witness has
no basis for estimating his responsibility to cooperate by appearing or answering questions if he is to avoid prosecution for crime.
The Committee's enabling resolution authorizes it to investigate:
"(i) the extent, character, and objects of un-American
propaganda activities in the United States,
"(ii) the diffusion within the United States of subversive
and un-American propaganda that is instigated from
foreign countries or of a domestic origin and attacks
the principle of the form of government as guaranteed
by our Constitution, and
"(iii) all other questions in relation thereto that would aid
Congress in any necessary remedial legislation."
In trying to determine whether he might or might not refuse
to answer a question as not pertinent a witness before the House
Committee might well find it difficult to know:
a. what "un-American propaganda" or "subversive and unAmerican propaganda" is;
b. whether the Committee is authorized to investigate all
"subversive and un-American propaganda . . . instigated
from foreign countries," oil only that subversive and unAmerican propaganda, foreign or domestic in origin, that
"attacks the principle of the form of government as guaranteed by our Constitution";
c. what "the principle [note the emphasis upon one principle] of the form of government as guaranteed by our
Constitution" is;
d. what ground is covered by "all other questions in relation
thereto."
46. United States v. Josephson, 165 F. 2d 82, 97 (2d Cir. 1947).
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The courts have conceded that this first argument under the
Fifth Amendment is a serious and substantial one, but in the end
they have rejected it in those specific situations in which it has
been raised. For example, in the Josephson case the majority
held that since the witness had refused to be sworn or to answer
47
any questions at all he was precluded from raising this defense.
More specifically in the Barsky and Lawson cases
the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that under that portion of the Committee's enabling act which authorizes it to investigate "the diffusion within the United States of subversive and
un-American propaganda that is instigated from foreign countries or of a domestic origin and attacks the principle of the form
of government as guaranteed by our Constitution," the pertinency
of a specific query as to a witness's membership in the Communist
Party is made clear. In the Lawson case Judge Bennett Clark
stated that it would be hard to imagine a more pertinent question
to an inquiry into un-American activity as defined in the resolution creating the Committee in view of the holding (of the Barsky
case) that Communism "is antithetical to the principles which
underlie the form of government incorporated in the Federal
Constitution and guaranteed by it to the States." 48
47. In the decision in the Josephson case the court added, "At the very
least the language of the authorizing statute permits investigating the advocacy of the idea that the Government or the Constitutional system of the
United States should be overthrown by force, rather than modified by the
peaceful process of amendment . . . . The vice of vagueness in that language,
if any, lies in the possibility that it may authorize, though we do not decide
that it does so, investigations relating to the advocacy of peaceful changes."
165 F. 2d 82, 88.
In the decision in the Barsky case the court inferred that, standing by
itself, Subclause (i) of the resolution might be regarded as so vague as to be
unconstitutional. But it concluded that Subclause (ii) "is definite enough."
And it added, "It conveys a clear meaning and that is all that is required.
The principles which underlie the form of the existing government in this
country are well-enough defined .... .. " In his dissenting opinion Judge
Edgerton chided the majority for putting "a plural where Congress put a
singular," and added, "To me it is not obvious how much Congress meant by
'the principle,' or how much the court means by 'the principles.'" 167 F. 2d
241, 247-248, 262 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
In the Morford case the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
made a rather petulant reply to the argument that the enabling resolution
was defective because of vagueness. It stated, "The Resolution authorized
investigation into propaganda which attacks the principle of our constitutionally-guaranteed form of government. It is difficult to imagine how the
standard could be further particularized, or how the test could be misunderstood. The National Council's literature either did or did not attack the
principle of our form of government. It was not necessary to justify inquiry
that there be an attack on our government, or an advocacy of its violent
overthrow; enough if the principle of our form of government were attacked."
176 F. 2d 54, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
48. Lawson v. United States, 176 F. 2d 49, 52, 53 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Barsky
v. United States, 167 F. 2d 241, 244, 248-249, 250 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
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A second argument under the Fifth Amendment which has
been raised against the Committee is that the implied right to
the equal protection of the laws under the Amendment has been
violated by the Committee because of the highly discriminatory
fashion in which it had investigated some types of propaganda
activity while ignoring others. In rejecting this argument in the
Josephson case the court was content to refer to "the wellestablished principle that the legislature need not strike at the
whole of an evil, but only at a part" and to add that in this respect
"the Congressional power to investigate is as flexible as its power
to legislate." 41
The third argument under the Fifth Amendment has concerned the privilege against self-incrimination. There has as yet
been no court case that has clearly raised the classic problem
outlined earlier, largely because the House Committee until recently allowed witnesses to refuse to answer questions where
they were willing to pay the price of pleading self-incrimination
to purchase the privilege of remaining silent.5 0 Prior to 1950 all
of the Committee's witnesses prosecuted for contempt had justified their refusal to answer questions on some other ground. For
example, in the Hollywood hearings refusal to answer the question concerning membership in the Communist Party was based
upon an alleged right under the First Amendment to remain
silent as to one's political affiliations. In 1950, the Committee did
reverse its policy concerning the self-incrimination issue, and, at
its request, the House of Representatives voted to order the prosecution of a number of witnesses who had refused to testify on
the ground of self-incrimination, but at the end of the year the
courts had not yet passed upon the legal issues involved in these
proceedings.
This sudden reversal of policy by the Committee may result
in its first setback by the appellate courts, for the soundness of
its legal case against these uncooperative witnesses is far from
clear. 5 There are many uncertainties about the law of selfincrimination but the following relevant points may be noted:
49. 165 F. 2d 82, 92 (2d Cir. 1947). See also the decision in the Barsky
case, 167 F. 2d 241, 251 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
50. Refusal of witnesses before the Un-American Activities Committee
to testify on grounds of self-incrimination occurred at the very beginning of
the Dies Committee hearings when Earl Browder and William Z. Foster
used this excuse to refuse to answer the Committee's questions. Moreover,
the Committee vacillated from the very beginning between accepting and
rejecting the ground as valid. See Ogden, The Dies Committee, 134, 143, 148,
196, 202 (1943).
51. The case of United States v. Rosen, 174 F. 2d 187, 192 (2d Cir. 1949),
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1. The Fifth Amendment expressly establishes the privilege
not to be a witness against one's self, as a federal right. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has consistently refused to recognize this
right as a basic or fundamental one-as one "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," as an "immutable principle of justice,"
as necessary to "a fair and enlightened system of justice," or as
"of the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty." 52 Since
this attitude has been expressed in cases where the right has
seemingly been denied to defendants in criminal cases, it is unlikely that the Court will show much enthusiasm for a holding
that witnesses before congressional committees are entitled to a
broad exercise of the right.
2. Nonetheless, it seems likely that. the Court will hold that
the Fifth Amendment right does extend generally to witnesses
before such committees.
3. It seems likely that the Court will hold that the immunity
statutes are inadequate and do not withdraw the constitutional
53
right from witnesses before congressional committees.
bears out this statement. Rosen appeared before a federal grand jury in New
York City in March, 1949, and refused on the ground of self-incrimination to
answer many of the same questions that he had earlier refused to answer
before the Un-American Activities Committee concerning the disposition
of the Ford roadster Alger Hiss claimed to have given Whittaker Chambers.
He was adjudged in contempt but the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
reversed the judgment on the ground that Rosen "was justified in believing
that he was in a precarious situation" and that"'he had the right to refuse
to answer questions which might connect him with the Ford car .... "
52. This attitude of the Court toward the right is expressed in cases in
which the Court has refused to hold that the Fourteenth Amendment carries
freedom from self-incrimination over into the area of state criminal procedure. Twining v. State of New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947). See also Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
53. Congress could presumably meet this difficulty by amending the
present immunity statute (18 U.S.C. § 3486 [1946]) so as to restore the absolute
immunity that was granted by the act of 1857. As the Washington Post put it
in an editorial in its issue of September 14, 1948, the problem is to devise an
immunity statute adequate to withdraw from witnesses before congressional
committees the privilege against self-incrimination, but not so sweeping as
to prevent the prosecution of a Fall or Meyers following his appearance before
such a committee. The Post suggests that committees of inquiry be given
discretionary power to grant complete immunity to witnesses on a selective
basis for "in the case of many witnesses subpoenaed before congressional
committees the value of having their stories told in public far exceeds the
public interest in their possible prosecution for some crime that might be
uncovered."
The problem has been elsewhere posed in the following language: "An
adequate Immunity statute would give to legislative committees the power
to require testimony of witnesses, but the question arises as to the wisdom
of enacting such a statute. Clearly, immunity as broad as that required by
the Supreme Court should not be granted unless the benefit to be derived
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4. The recent decision of the Supreme Court in the Blau case,
although specifically concerned with the rights of a witness before
a federal grand jury, indicates that a witness before a congressional committee may rightfully refuse on the ground of selfincrimination to answer the specific question, "Are you now or
have you ever been a member of the Communist Party?" 54
5. Many witnesses before the House Un-American Activities
Committee have used the self-incrimination ground in seemingly
improper and even irresponsible fashion to refuse to answer questions, answers to which could not possibly incriminate them,
either because such answers would not relate to criminal conduct
or because the statute of limitations had run with respect to any
criminal conduct that might be revealed. Perhaps the most ridiculous assertion of the right occurred during the 1948 Communist
Espionage hearings when Henry Collins used this ground to refuse
to answer the question, "Do you belong to the American Legion?"
and Lee Pressman refused to answer the Committee's question,
"Have you ever been in the Pennsylvania Railroad station in
New York City?" 55
6. A careful reading of the printed hearings suggests that
the Committee has not always established a satisfactory basis for
a prosecution under Section 192 of those witnesses who have
refused to testify on grounds of self-incrimination because of its
failure to have informed such witnesses that they were using
the ground improperly or to have directed them to answer such
questions. In a judicial proceeding it is customary for a judge to
follow such a policy before holding an uncooperative witness in
contempt of court. As a matter of fact, the printed hearings reveal
statements by Committee members to the effect that the Committee recognizes and accepts the use by witnesses of the selfincrimination ground to refuse to answer questions.5
from the possible increased efficacy of legislative investigations is suffict
to outweigh the social loss implicit in legislative largesse to admitted criminals. In England, the benefit derived from legislative investigations has been
deemed to justify such immunity for over one hundred and fifty years.

Whether the possibility of increasing the effectiveness

of congressional

committees similarly justifies the granting of such a broad immunity is a
question for serious congressional deliberation." Note, 49 Col. L. Rev. 87

(1949).
54. Blau v. United States, 19 U.S. Law Week 4062, 4094 (1950, 1951). But
cf. Rogers v. United States, 19 U.S. Law Week 4094 (1951).
55. Hearings Regarding Communist Espionage in the United States

Government, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 807, 1026 (1948).

Pressman finally relented

and "in a spirit of cooperation" informed the Committee that he had taken a
train in said station the same morning.
56. Id. at 591 (Mundt), 695, 1026 (Nixon). In the second instance Repre-
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One of the cases growing out of the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Committee hearings which reached the Supreme Court did raise
a secondary issue of self-incrimination. The case was United
States v. Bryan. Helen Bryan, executive secretary of the JAFRC,
was found guilty of contempt for refusing to produce the organization's records before the Committee and to answer the question
whether the organization's executive board supported her action
in this respect. At her trial in the district court the transcript of
the proceedings before the Committee, including the defendant's
testimony, was accepted as evidence. On appeal, Bryan argued
that this had, in effect, forced her to be a witness against herself.
In the majority opinion of the Supreme Court, Chief Justice
Vinson admitted that the literal language of Title 18, Section 3486,
United States Code, which grants immunity to witnesses before
congressional committees against the use of their testimony in
any subsequent criminal proceeding against them, except in a
prosecution for perjury committed in giving such testimony, seemingly had been violated in this case. But the majority held that
thus to apply the statute in this case "would subvert the congressional purpose in its passage" and lead "to absurd conclusions."
In effect, the majority asked how a recalcitrant witness could be
prosecuted for contempt without the introduction as evidence of
a transcript of the Committee proceedings to demonstrate the
contemptuous conduct of the witness.
In a vigorous dissenting opinion Justices Black and Frankfurter insisted that Congress had revealed a clear intention in
the statute to make only one exception to the prohibition against
the use of testimony in a congressional hearing in a later criminal
sentative Nixon told the witness, Victor Perlo, "You have the right to plead
self-incrimination on any particular matter, and you will note that the committee has never questioned that matter, and you will note that the commit-

" On the other hand, there were
tee has never questioned that right ..
instances where the Committee did seemingly reject the ground, order a
witness to answer questions, and warn him that further refusal to testify
might result in contempt proceedings against him. For example:
"Mr. Nixon. Now, Mr. Rosen and counsel, I want you to listen carefully.
You may refuse to answer questions on the ground of self-incrimination. It
is possible that the answer given might involve you in a crime, but this com-

mittee is unable to see how any answer concerning whether or not you
purchased a 1929 automobile could involve you in a crime, particularly since
any crime that could be involved in the purchase of such a car would now
be outlawed by the statute of limitations.
"I will instruct you further that If you refuse to answer a question concerning a 1929 automobile on the- grounds of self-incrimination and if the
committee comes to the conclusion that no crime could be involved, that it

will be the duty of this committee to cite you for contempt of Congress." Id.
at 1209-1210.
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proceeding against a witness-that of a prosecution for perjuryand they accused the majority of "judicial law-making." Moreover, they insisted that a strict interpretation of the statute would
not lead to absurd conclusions because it would be perfectly
possible in a contempt case for the prosecution to call witnesses
who could testify as to the defendant's contemptuous conduct
before a congressional committee, thus making it unnecessary to
introduce as evidence a transcript of the accused's own testimony
(or refusal to testify). This seems like hair-splitting on the part
of the dissenters, for it is hard to understand the reasoning by
which an official transcript of what transpired at a congressional
hearing should be excluded while the word of persons present in
the Committee room should be admitted. It is perhaps significant
that the two dissenters were not prepared to say that the statute,
as interpreted by the majority, violated the self-incrimination
clause of the Fifth Amendment. Instead they were content to
argue that the Court was misinterpreting the statute.
Has the Committee inflicted punishment upon its witnesses
thus violating the constitutional prohibition against bills of attainder? It has been argued that the House Committee has tried
certain individuals on the charge of subversive activity, has found
them guilty, and has then subjected them to punishment by stirring up public opinion against them and in some instances causing
them to lose their jobs. The result has been, the argument continues, to deprive such persons of their right to trial by jury
under the Sixth Amendment. Much the same argument is seen
in the claim that the punitive effect which certain Committee
hearings have had upon witnesses amounts to a bill of attainder
in violation of section nine, Article One of the Constitution. In
terms of traditional constitutional law it is difficult to take this
particular argument seriously. The bill of attainder and trial by
jury clauses of the Constitution have generally been thought of
as concerning only the individual who is accused of criminal
conduct. Clearly, the Committee has not in any such formal sense
been trying its witnesses for crimes. It is true that in 1946 in
United States v. Lovett a divided Supreme Court did hold that
action by Congress in an appropriation act ordering that no funds
should be used to pay the salaries of three named federal officers
amounted to a bill of attainder and was thus unconstitutional.
The Court said:
"Section 304, thus, clearly accomplishes the punishment
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of named individuals without a judicial trial. The fact that
the punishment is inflicted through the instrumentality of
an Act specifically cutting off the pay of certain named individuals found guilty of disloyalty, makes it no less galling
or effective than if it had been done by an Act which designated the conduct as criminal. No one would think that Congress could have passed a valid law, stating that after investigation it had found Lovett, Dodd, and Watson 'guilty' of the
crime of engaging in 'subversive activities,' defined that term
for the first time, and sentenced them to perpetual exclusion
from any government employment. Section 304, while it
does not 'use that language, accomplishes that result. The
effect was to inflict punishment without the safeguards of a
judicial trial and 'determined by no previous law or fixed rule.'
The Constitution declares that that cannot be done.. . .",
The decision in the Lovett case has undoubtedly encouraged
witnesses who have been prosecuted for contempt of the House
Committee to raise the bill of attainder argument in their defense,
and the issue has actually received some consideration at the
appellate court level. In the Eisler case the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia ruled that the trial court had properly
refused Eisler permission to introduce evidence showing that the
Committee's real purpose in calling him as a witness had been to
harass and punish him for his political beliefs. The court of
appeals stated that Congress's power to compel private persons
to appear and give testimony in aid of the legislative function is
beyond question and that the courts have "no authority to scrutinize the motives of Congress or one of its committees." 58
Actually it would be a considerable step from the Lovett
decision to a Supreme Court holding that the Un-American Activities Committee has violated the bill of attainder clause of the
Constitution by holding one of its witnesses up to public opprobrium or causing him to lose his job with a private employer. In
the Lovett case there was no doubt whatsoever that the loss of
job was the direct result of deliberate congressional action.. There
was no doubt that Congress imposed this penalty because it was
convinced of the disloyalty of the three men dismissed. For the
Court to call this action a bill of attainder represented a step
beyond established constitutional law on the subject, but its
decision was supported by a perfectly clear factual situation.
57. 328 U.S. 303, 316 (1946).
58. 170 F. 2d 273, 279 (D. C. Cir. 1948).
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The facts supporting the often-made charge that the House
Committee is more interested in seeing certain of its witnesses
suffer loss of reputation or job than it is in obtaining factual
information as a basis for the enactment of legislation by Congress are far less clear. This is not to say that the Committee has
not been so motivated. But for any court to isolate the evidence
suggesting that this has been so, while simultaneously ignoring
the interest shown by the Committee, however slight, in facts as
a basis for legislation and to conclude that the Constitution has
been violated would be an act of judicial arrogance. 9
In another sense, however, the bill of attainder argument
raises an issue that cannot be easily dismissed. There can be
little doubt that certain witnesses before the Un-American Activities Committee have suffered and been punished in just as realistic a sense as though they had been placed on trial in a criminal
court and traditional criminal sanctions had been invoked against
them. Professor John Frank has written: "Our own generation
is finding more sophisticated ways of ... putting economic instead
59. The Hollywood hearings, already mentioned, provide perhaps the
strongest basis for such a judicial finding. Ten witnesses lost their jobs in
the motion picture industry as the result of their refusal to answer the House
Committee's questions. To say that this development pleased the Committee

would be gross understatement.

Moreover, the Committee showed so little

interest in possible legislative action based upon the investigation that it did
not even bother to file a formal report of its findings with the House of
Representatives. At the same time, a court decision which accepted the
conclusion that the Committee was interested in seeing its witnesses punished
and disinterested in legislation would necessarily be based upon rumor,
inference, and conjecture. For the courts to attempt to check the legislative
process at the committee stage on any such uncertain basis would be
deplorable.
A further argument against judicial supervision of congressional investigations is the difficulty the courts might have in enforcing decisions adverse
to the congressional interest. One may doubt whether rulings in the Barsky
or Josephson cases that the Un-American Activities Committee was an
unconstitutional body would have brought an end to the Committee. All that
was before the courts was the legality of the convictions of Barsky and
Josephson under Section 192. The courts could have seen to it that the two
men did not go to jail but it is a fair guess that the Committee would have
gone right on with its program and that the House of Representatives would
have supported it. Moreover, to provide a sanction to compel witnesses to
cooperate with the Committee the House could have reverted to the early
pradtice of bringing recalcitrant witnesses before its own bar to be tried for
contempt, instead of turning them over to the courts for trial under Section
192. It is true that the courts have, from the time of Anderson v. Dunn,
claimed the right to review such proceedings. But there has never been a
showdown with the courts on the issue of which branch has the ultimate
authority in this situation. If a witness were tried before the House, found
guilty, and ordered imprisoned by the House Sergeant-at-Arms for the duration of the session, would not the House hold the upper hand if it simply
refused to recognize the validity of any court ruling ordering the prisoner
set free, and if it protected its Sergeant-at-Arms against any reprisal by the
courts?

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XI

of criminal sanctions on persons whose speech is offensive. These
sanctions ought to be recognized as mere variants of criminal
sanctions, and ought to be subject to the same tests." 10 Here the
degree to which the hearings of this congressional committee have
been personalized establishes a real threat to the future of congressional inquiries as fact-finding, legislative-aiding agencies. If
in fact these committees are to be used increasingly as the means
of exposing and "punishing" individuals deemed dangerous to
the public welfare by committee members then we shall have
no choice, if we wish to preserve the most basic traditions of
Anglo-American criminal procedure, but to subject such agencies
to drastic controls-controls that may well hamper their effectiveness as fact-finding agencies. But that such control should
now be achieved by encouraging the courts to see bills of attainder
in committee treatment of witnesses would seem to be an exceedingly dubious way of dealing with this problem.
Miscellaneous constitutional arguments against the House
Committee. A number of miscellaneous arguments have been
raised against the Un-American Activities Committee, no one of
which has received much support from the courts. One of the
most ingenious of the arguments attacks the Committee through
its personnel on the ground that the election of such southerners
to the House of Representatives as John Rankin has taken place
in violation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. Their
illegal election by an electorate from which Negroes have been
unlawfully excluded is said to taint the congressional actions in
which they have participated, including their committee activities.61 The argument obviously proves too much and no judge
has given it serious consideration.
In the Eisler case the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia considered the argument that, because the House Committee had denied Eisler's request that he be granted three minutes in which to state legal objections to the hearing before he
was sworn, a conviction for willful default because of failure to
obey a subpoena summoning him to appear and give testimony
60. Frank, The United States Supreme Court: 1949-50, 18 U. of Chi. L. Rev.
1, 32 (1950).

61. For example, one of the reasons given by Lee Pressman for his
refusal to answer questions put to him by the Committee on August 20, 1948,
was the following: ". . . the committee is unlawfully constituted by reason
of the presence thereon of one John Rankin, who holds an alleged seat as a
Member of Congress from Mississippi." Communist Espionage Hearings,
supra note 55, at 1023.
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could not stand. The trial judge had not allowed Eisler an opportunity to present evidence that he had merely wanted to state
such legal objections. By a two-to-one vote the court rejected
this argument. In the majority opinion Judge Bennett Clark says
that in asking for a few minutes Eisler had not told the Committee that he wanted to state legal objections to the hearing.
Clark accepts the Un-American Activities Committee's version
of the episode-that Eisler had held in his hands a lengthy mimeographed statement he intended to read before being sworn and
that the document would have taken much more than three
minutes to read. In his dissenting opinion Judge Prettyman states
that he thinks Eisler should have been allowed at his trial to show
that his purpose in. asking the Committee for time had been
merely to state legal objections to the proceedings, for, in Prettyman's opinion, such evidence would have been significant in show62
ing that Eisler had not willfully defaulted.
The validity of certain of the contempt proceedings growing
out of the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee hearings was
challenged before the Supreme Court in 1950 on the ground that
the presence of a quorum of the Committee members at the time
the alleged contemptuous conduct occurred had not been proved.
The Court rejected this argument holding that the statute that
declares a witness who willfully defaults when subpoenaed to
produce papers before a congressional committee guilty of a misdemeanor does not require that a quorum of the committee be
present when the contempt occurs.63
United States v. Fleischman, a companion to the Bryan case,
62. Eisler v. United States, 170 F.

2d 273 (D.C. Cir. 1948).

The Supreme

Court agreed to review the case, but when Eisler fled the country in May,
1948, a majority of the justices, in a per curiam opinion, held that the case
should be removed from the docket, pending the return of the fugitive. Chief
Justice Vinson and Justice Frankfurter indicated in a dissenting opinion
that they favored dismissing the case outright, for want of jurisdiction. On
the other hand, in separate dissenting opinions, Justices Murphy and Jackson

stated their belief that the Court should have proceeded to decide the case on
its merits, Eisler's flight notwithstanding. Alone among the justices, Jackson
indicated how he would have decided the case. He would have affirmed the
conviction of Eisler. Eisler v. United States, 338 U.S. 189 (1949).
63. United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323 (1950); United States v. Fleischman, 339 U.S. 349 (1950). In 1949, by a five-to-four vote, the Supreme Court
had set aside a conviction for perjury committed before a congressional
committee on the ground that a quorum of the committee had not been
present at the time of the perjury. However, the decision rested on the
ground that in the absence of a quorum such a committee was not a "competent tribunal" as required by the perjury statute under which the prosecution had taken place. Christoffel v. United States, 338 U.S. 84 (1949). The
contempt statute in the Bryan and Fleischman cases did not contain this
same phraseology.
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raised an additional issue to those passed upon by the Supreme
Court in the latter case. Fleischman, one of sixteen members of
the board of directors of the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee, had been found guilty of contempt for her part in the
collective failure of the board to produce the organization records
before the House Committee. It was argued before the Supreme
Court that at her trial the government should have been required
to prove that as a single member of the board she had had it
within her power to take some effective step toward collective
action by the board to produce the records. The Supreme Court
majority rejected this argument and held that the burden of the
proof had properly, been placed on the defendant to show that
she had done all she could to get the board to produce the records.
The evidence indicated that she had done nothing toward that

end. 64
Some of the Un-American Activities Committee cases that
have reached the appellate courts have raised issues as to trial
court procedures, which have had nothing to do directly with
the authority or procedures of the Committee. For example, in
Dennis v. United States, it was argued that when Dennis was
tried under Section 192 for contempt of the House Committee the
trial court had erred in failing to sustain Dennis's challenge for
cause of all prospective jurors who were employed by the federal
government on the ground that they could not help but show
bias because of the existence of the federal loyalty program. By
a five-to-two vote the Court rejected the argument.6 5 On the
other hand, during the same term the Supreme Court in a per
curiam opinion in Morford v. United States held that the defendant's right to an impartial jury had been infringed where the
trial court had refused to allow him to interrogate prospective
government employee jurors concerning their ability to render
a just verdict in the face of their own troubles under the loyalty
program. Morford was granted a new trial and was then found
guilty a second time. 66
64. 339 U.S. 349 (1950). Justices Black and Frankfurter dissented, and
Justices Douglas and Clark did not participate. Justice Black stated in the
dissenting opinion: "Refusal [under Section 192] to comply with a subpoena

to produce papers can be punished only if the witness has power to produce.
It is a complete defense for him to show that the papers are not in his
possession or under his control .... A command to produce is not a command
to get others to produce or assist in producing."
65. 339 U.S. 162 (1950).
66. 339 U.S. 258 (1950). This reversal of the judgment in the first Morford
trial is the only instance where an Un-American Activities Committee witness
has obtained a favorable ruling from an appellate court. The judgment In
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The Dissenting Opinions of Judges Clark and Edgerton-In
both the Josephson and Barsky cases the verdicts of guilty were
affirmed at the court of appeals level by two-to-one votes. In the
Josephson case Judge Charles E. Clark dissented and in the
Barsky case Judge Henry W. Edgerton dissented. Each of these
judges wrote a long dissenting opinion in which the constitutional
arguments against the House Committee are examined in systematic fashion and in which certain of these arguments receive
vigorous, unqualified approval. Each is an eminent judge. Clark
was once Dean of the Yale Law School and Edgerton was a professor at the Cornell Law School. Accordingly, the careful, detailed statements of these men that the Un-American Activities
Committee does violence to the Constitution of the United States
should receive respectful attention, even though the Supreme
Court was seemingly so little impressed by their stands that it
refused to grant certiorari.
Both judges would accept the argument that the House Committee's enabling act is unconstitutional because it encroaches
upon rights safeguarded by the First Amendment, both would
hold that the enabling act is so vague that when coupled with a
criminal statute to punish witnesses for failure to cooperate with
the Committee it comes into conflict with the Fifth Amendment,
and Judge Edgerton would also hold the enabling act invalid as
a bill of attainder.
In considering the argument under the First Amendment,
Judge Clark draws heavily upon an unsigned note, entitled "Constitutional Limitations on the Un-American Activities Committee." 67 He picks up two points that are suggested somewhat
tentatively in this article, namely, that Congress cannot undertake a completely unlimited inquiry in the area of the First
Amendment, and that it cannot accomplish by publicity what it
cannot do by legislation, and lends both his support. His own
reasoning runs somewhat as follows:
The investigative power of Congress can be no broader than
the extreme limits of it§ legislative power. In matters affecting
speech and press the legislative and investigative powers are
both limited by the clear and present danger test. If a statute
sought to restrict speech and press in words as broad and vague
the second Morford trial was sustained by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia and the Supreme Court refused to grant certiorari. 184
F. 2d 864 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
67. See note 5, supra.

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XI

as those used in the Committee's enabling resolution it would
certainly be declared unconstitutional. This being the case, the
resolution itself is unconstitutional, for Congress may not do by
investigation what is forbidden as legislation. If the resolution
were worded in the pattern of the Alien Registration Act of 1940
to the effect that the House Committee is directed to investigate
propaganda advocating the overthrow of the government by force
or violence it could be held constitutional, just as the 1940 act
has been.68
To put it somewhat differently, Judge Clark agrees that Congress may properly conduct an investigation to discover whether
there are facts suggesting the existence of a clear and present
danger to the well-being of the state which it may then seek to
curb by legislation. But such an investigation must be limited
to a search for information concerning the kind of clear and
present danger that can be met by legislation if it is found to
exist. As it is, even if the Un-American Activities Committee
does discover unmistakable evidence of the diffusion within the
United States of propaganda of a domestic origin attacking "the
principle" of the form of American government, Congress cannot
constitutionally seek to suppress such propaganda by legislation.
Thus the resolution is broader than it needs to be, and is at the
same time unconstitutional.
Judge Clark, and Judge Edgerton as well, reject the further
argument on behalf of the House Committee that since in the
cases at hand it was staying within proper bounds, in that it was
actually seeking information pertaining to the program of international Communism, the enabling resolution should not be held
to violate the First Amendment orw the ground it contains language that would permit the Committee to go beyond proper
bounds. Edgerton says on this point, "Even if the views the House
Committee sought to elicit from these appellants had been of a
sort that Congress might properly restrain, by investigative or
other action aimed specifically at such views, the appealed convictions would have to be reversed. 'The statute, as construed
and applied, amounts merely to a dragnet which may enmesh
anyone who agitates for a change of government .

',"
69

68. The 1940 act has been declared constitutional by the Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit in Dunne v. United States, 138 F. 2d 137 (8th Cir. 1943),
and by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in United States v. Dennis,
183 F. 2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950).
69. 167 F. 2d 241, 258 (D.C. Cir. 1948). The quoted passage is from the
opinion in Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 263 (1937).
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Judge Edgerton is also impressed by the fact that the Alien
Registration Act has been law since 1940 and that it goes about
as far in curbing un-American propaganda as any constitutional
act can, that is, it outlaws propaganda advocating the overthrow
of government by force and violence. This leads him to the conclusion that the House of Representative's purpose in setting up
the Un-American Activities Committee was exposure of certain
propaganda activities much less specific or dangerous than this,
and not a search for factual information as a basis for further
legislation. Thus, again the House appears to be seeking to accomplish by exposure what cannot be done by legislation.
Judge Edgerton also holds that the First Amendment establishes the right of a person to remain silent as to political beliefs
and affiliations and that the resolution establishing the Committee
has encroached upon that right.
Little need be added to what has already been said about
the Fifth Amendment argument. Both judges are of the opinion
that the key word in the resolution authorizing the Committee
to investigate certain types of propaganda is "un-American,"
that this word is so vague that no witness before the Committee
can possibly know when he is entitled to refuse to cooperate on
the ground that a particular line of inquiry being pursued by the
Committee exceeds its grant of authority or that certain questions
being put by it are not pertinent to a permissible line of inquiry,
and that thus any attempt to punish an uncooperative witness
under such a criminal statute as Section 192 violates the due
process clause of the-Fifth Amendment." °
On the bill of attainder point, Judge Edgerton holds that the
Committee's enabling act, as construed and applied by the Committee, creates an offense against the United States, "delegates
to the Committee the ascertainment of individuals to be punished
and the infliction of punishment; provides no standard of guilt;
compels the individual, in the committee's discretion, to testify
against himself; deprives him of the right to testify in his own
defense; and deprives him also of the right to counsel, the right
to call witnesses, and the right to cross-examine opposing wit70. Judge Clark concludes: "Since this is a penal statute we are called
upon to enforce, standards so vague and doubtful should be adjudged
insufficient under the settled requirements that prohibited conduct must for
criminal purposes be set forth with clarity, so that the person to whom It
applies may determine what conduct is legal and what is not." 165 F. 2d
82, 97 (2d Cir. 1947).
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nesses." 71 He holds that the Committee has intentionally inflicted
punishment on certain persons by bringing about their "dismissal
from employment" and by subjecting them to "publicity and
opprobrium." He then quotes with approval the holding of the
Supreme Court in the Lovett case that no "congressional action,
aimed at ... named individuals, which stigmatize [s] their reputation and seriously impair[s] their chance to earn a living" can
72
be sustained.
Judges Clark and Edgerton have undoubtedly made the most
of the constitutional case against the House Committee and at
times their arguments are quite persuasive. But when everything
is considered, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the measure of judicial review of the investigating power of Congress
which their stand entails would give to the courts a dangerous
degree of power to check the legislative branch of the government. In spite of the fact that he takes the highly dubious stand
of the Supreme Court in the Kilbourn case as his point of departure, Judge Clark ends his opinion with an acknowledgement
that the congressional investigation has been "so productive of
good in so many instances in our history, that no one would
wish to hamper it improperly." He agrees also that "the force
of public opinion and the expression of the electorate at the polls
must remain its main source of control." But he nonetheless
'asserts that in "the narrow, though important, field of constitutional liberties, more control is desirable" and he finds a rationalization for a judicial check upon the House Un-American Activities Committee in the thought that the Committee's exercise of
the investigative power is endangering the standing of this allimportant power in the minds of a liberty-loving people and that
accordingly "the application of a proper restraint" will prove "a
source of strength in the long run, rather than the reverse." 73
It seems wise to abandon the hope that the Un-American
Activities Committee may be curbed or destroyed through judicial intervention. It seems apparent that the courts, least of all
the Supreme Court, have no intention of exercising the power
of judicial review to the point where serious constitutional defects
will be found in the Committee's authority or procedures. Only
once in history has the Supreme Court challenged a congressional
investigation as to its basic constitutionality and it seems likely
71. 167 F. 2d 241, 260 (D.C. Cir. 1948).

72. Ibid.
73. 165 F. 2d 82, 100 (2d Cir. 1947).
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that, while the Court has never said so in so many words, it is
now of the opinion that this decision was a mistake. It is, of
course, perfectly possible for Congress to violate the Constitution
by authorizing an investigation whose subject matter lies beyond
the limits of congressional power. But since an investigation
does not in itself amount to a statement of public policy to which
all citizens must conform, but is rather a means by which the
legislative process is carried on, there is considerable weight to
the argument that the duty to see that no violence is done the
Constitution by such an investigation rests with Congress itself
and not with the judiciary.
It is true that where the issue of the constitutionality of a
congressional investigation reaches the courts in a case involving
personal liberty-where, perhaps, a person faces a jail term because of failure to cooperate with an investigating committee
about whose constitutionality there may be doubts-a strong
argument exists for judicial activism rather than judicial selfrestraint. The issue of the constitutionality of a congressional
investigation does not come before the courts in abstract fashion;
it comes usually in cases in which there are very real opposing
interests or rights and where refusal of the courts to accept jurisdiction will result in automatic victory for the congressional interest as against the interest of private individuals. One is strongly
tempted to favor vigorous use of judicial power to protect those
individuals who have been subjected by a congressional committee to harsh or arbitrary treatment. Where that can be done
without the necessity of simultaneous judicial scrutiny of the
propriety of an investigation or of procedures essential to its
success, resort to the courts by wronged individuals may readily
be encouraged. Unfortunately, the price that would have to be
paid for court assistance to such individuals would often necessarily be substantial interference with the congressional inquisitorial power itself. Moreover, it is apparent from the record of
congressional inquiries that the great majority of witnesses who
have been prosecuted for contempt have invited the result. They
havre carefully calculated the risks, and for reasons that seemed
sufficient to them have deliberately challenged the power of
Congress and have willfully refused to cooperate. Almost never
has a witness who was merely naive, bewildered, or foolishly
assertive of an extreme view of individualism gone to jail for
contempt. Certainly the witnesses who have tangled with the
Un-American Activities Committee knew what they were doing;
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often they were arrogant, dogmatic, and vituperative. It is hard
to find in the record of the hearings much support for a view
of them as innocent, grievously-wronged citizens who were defending the cause of liberty and democracy against a too-pervasive
arm of the state. This is in no sense to defend the Un-American
Activities Committee-its purposes, its methods, or its record.
But it cannot be denied that its recalcitrant witnesses fall readily
into the tradition of the Daughertys, the Sinclairs, and the Dr.
Townsends-men who willfully defied the inquisitorial arm of
the national legislature and invited the consequences that they
experienced. We have to choose, and it does not appear that the
harm done such persons who have been punished for contempt
would justify the threat to legislative power which a vigorous
judicial supervision of investigations would entail.
In his opinion in the Eisler case Justice Jackson said, "...
I
think it would be an unwarranted act of judicial usurpation to
strip Congress of its investigatory power, or to assume for the
courts the function of supervising congressional committees. I
should . . . leave the responsibility for the behavior of its committees squarely on the shoulders of Congress." 74 In the end it
seems a sound conclusion that the answer to the Un-American
Activities Committee is not to be found in the courts; it must be
found within Congress itself.
74. Eisler v. United States, 338 U.S. 189, 196 (1949). This was a dissenting
opinion, but the majority justices would not necessarily have disagreed with

Jackson's feeling as expressed in these words.

Wyzanski, Standards for

Congressional Investigations, 3 Record of the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York 93, 104 (1948): "If it be conceded that it is desirable that
there should be a continuance of the practice of compelling private persons

to testify before Congressional committees on matters upon which legislation
may be

adopted,

the question

remains

as

to what

reforms

should

be

instituted.
"Should there be a wider ambit of judicial review? ...
This and indeed
any other broadening of judicial review seem to me ill-advised remedies. . ..
Moreover, the suggestion of a broadened judicial review of legislative investigations is founded upon a not universally shared view that the power of
judges should be extended because they are ultimately the surest guardians
of our liberty. After all it was a judge who told us 'it must be remembered
that legislatures are ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of the
people in quite as great a degree as the courts.'"

